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FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW AND THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

"The first of your fruits of your ground you shall bring into
the house of the Lord your God." 1
but
of the law that the debtor be just before he
"[1It is the policy
2
be generous."
I. INTRODUCTION
With the steadily increasing number of bankruptcy filings,3 bankruptcy law

* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law, B.A., Smith College, 1984;

J.D. University of Michigan, 1987. The author would like to thank David Gray Carlson, Lester
Snyder, Donald Wiggins, and William Whitford for helpful discussions on the subject of this
article. Additional thanks to Eric Benink and Mark Davis for their research assistance. Thanks
also to Professor Stephen Carter, whose book on religion, law, and politics inspired the title of
this article. See STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
1. Exodus 23:19.
2. Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jano, 27 N.E.2d 814, 816 (N.Y. 1940).
3. See Fred R. Bleakley, Personal-BankruptcyFilings Are Soaring, WALL ST. J., May 8,
1996, at A2 (reporting that the total number of bankruptcy filings rose 27% between January 1
and April 26, 1996, the largest four month rate of increase since 1986 and the biggest four-month
total ever); Toddi Gutner, PersonalBankruptcy:How to Slow the Stampede, Bus. WK., Sept. 9,
1996, at 46 (noting that 1.1 million families are expected to file for bankruptcy in 1996, a26%
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finds itself entangled with new contentions, pitting law and social policy
against one another. This interplay is especially evident in cases involving
bankruptcy trustees who attempt to use the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent
transfer statute to recover donations to religious institutions.4
Consider the case of Bruce and Nancy Young and the Crystal Evangelical
Free Church. 5 The Youngs contributed or "tithed" 6 $13,450 to the church in
the year before they filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy
trustee brought an action in the bankruptcy court seeking to recover this sum.
The trustee's theory was based on constructive fraud. 7 That is, the trustee

increase over 1995). The number of bankruptcy petitions filed nationwide has risen steadily since

the late 1980s. See Karen Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual
Debtors, 88 Micii. L. REV. 1506, 1512 n.18 (1990) (reviewing TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ET AL.,
As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRuPTcY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989));

see also Mary Josephine Newborn [Wiggins], UndersecuredCreditorsinBankruptcy: Dewsnup,
Nobelman, and theDecline of Priority,25 ARIz. ST. L.J. 547, 552 n.12 (1993) (citing the rising
number of filings between 1988 and 1991).
4. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir.
1996), petitionforcert.filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1996) (No. 96-437); Fitzgerald
v. Magic Valley Evangelical Church, Inc. (Inre Hodge), 200 B.R. 884 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1996);
Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995),
aff'd, 203 B.R. 468 (D. Kan. 1996); Ellenberg v. Chapel Hill Harvester Church, Inc. (In re
Moses), 59 B.R. 815 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986); Wilson v. Upreach Ministries (In re Missionary
Baptist Found. of Am., Inc.), 24 B.R. 973 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
In addition, many of the amendments to the Code in the recent Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994 seem designed to respond to social problems, including child support enforcement, divorce
obligations, and mass torts. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1994) (creating a new exception
to discharge for any debt incurred in connection with a divorce or separation agreement); 11
U.S.C. § 547(c)(7) (1994) (preventing trustees from avoiding transfers made to former spouses
or children for support or maintenance as preferential transfers); and 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 524(g), (h)
(1994) (establishing a procedure for dealing, in a Chapter 11 reorganization case, with future
personal injury claims against the debtor based on exposure to asbestos containing products). See
generally Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.) (amending the above-mentioned Bankruptcy Code
sections in response to social problems).
5. Young, 82 F.3d at 1407.
6. THE NEW MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY defines a "tithe" as "a 10th paid or given,
esp. for the support of a church." THE NEW MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 751 (1989). In the
Judeo-Christian tradition, biblical support for the practice of tithing can be found in several
passages of the Old and New testaments. See Deuteronomy 14:22-29; Malachi 3:8-10; Hebrews
7:8. The Islamic faith also observes a similar tradition, called the
"zakat." RICHARD TAMES, APPROACHES To ISLAM 39 (1982).
7. Young, 82 F.3d at 1410. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1994) reads, in pertinent part:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year
before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily..
. received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation ....

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss4/4

2

Wiggins: A Statute of Disbelief?: Clashing Ethical Imperatives in Fraudule
1997]

A STATUTE OF DISBELIEF: CLASHING ETHICAL IMPERATIVES

773

argued that the debtors received "less than a reasonably equivalent value"' in
exchange for their contributions. 9 In response, the church made two arguments: First, the church asserted that the debtors did receive reasonably
equivalent value because they received, among other things, spiritual
counseling. 1" Second, the church urged that such an application of fraudulent
transfer law would violate the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the
United States Constitution.II The church lost at the bankruptcy court and the
district court levels but appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 12
After the district court decided the case, but before the Eighth Circuit heard
oral argument, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 ("RFRA"). 13 The aim of RFRA was to overrule Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 4 a case in which the United States
Supreme Court ruled that facially neutral laws of general applicability
that burden the exercise of religion require no special justification to satisfy
First Amendment scrutiny.' 5 RFRA restored to free exercise jurisprudence
what is known as the "compelling interest test" 6 as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner 7 and Wisconsin v. Yoder." Under this test, the government may
substantially burden a person's 6xercise of religion only if it demonstrates
that the application of the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest. 19
To the delight of the bankruptcy trustee, the Clinton Administration filed
an amicus brief in support of the trustee's position in Young.Y' However,

8. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A).
9. Young, 82 F.3d at 1410.
10. Id. at 1410, 1414.
11. Id. at 1411.
12. Id. at 1409-10.
13. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000 bb-4 (1994);
Young, 82 F.3d at 1412.
14. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
15. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-80.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b)(1).
17. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
18. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a) to (b). A case challenging the constitutionality of RFRA is
now before the United States Supreme Court. See Flores v. City of Boeme, Tex., 73 F.3d 1352
(5th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996). One bankruptcy court, in a fraudulent transfer
case factually similar to Young, has found RFRAunconstitutional. See Fitzgerald v. Magic Valley
Evangelical Free Church, Inc. (In re Hodge), 200 B.R. 884 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1996).
20. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1413 (8th
Cir. 1996), petitionfor cert.filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1996) (No. 96-437); see
Laurie Goodstein, Religious GroupsFightU.S. inBankruptcy Case, WASH. POST, May 23, 1994
at Al.
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shortly before the Eighth Circuit heard oral argument, the Administration,
relying in part on RFRA, withdrew its brief and its support.21
Some in the religious community reacted to the lower court opinions in
Young with considerable displeasure.' In their,view, there was no convincing
justification for the courts' holdings. Religious organizations argued that the
money given to churches did purchase something of value in the form of
intangible religious benefits.23 By pursuing these tithes, they argued, the
government was striking at the essence of constitutionally protected religious
freedoms. 24 The Clinton campaign echoed this view in a campaign advertisement that began, "Protecting religious freedom. It's the foundation of our
nation. When the Justice Department went after a church to gather the
parishioners' tithing money, the government was stopped cold because
President Clinton overturned the government policy and protected us."'
Bankruptcy trustees reiterated that the Youngs and other similarly situated
parishioners simply did not receive "reasonably equivalent value" for their
donations as that term is defined in the Code.2 6 Further and in response to the
constitutional arguments offered by religious institutions, the trustees asserted
that the government has a compelling interest in the payment of debts:
protecting the property of creditors.27
Perhaps not surprisingly, the rhetoric on both sides of this issue became
heated. Religious organizations accused bankruptcy trustees of ushering in
rampant religious repression." Those supportive of trustees contended
21. Young, 82 F.3d at 1413; see Religious Liberty in America: Hearings Before the Senate
JudiciaryCommittee, (1995) (statement of Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee);
Clinton Orders Withdrawal of Brief by Justice Agency, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1994, at B5;
Sherrie Nackman, Bill Clinton's Divine Intervention, AM. LAW., Nov. 1994, at 15; Gustav
Niebuhr, Justice Department Withdraws Brief in Tithing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1994,
at B18.
22. See Tim Bryant, Clinton Pulls U.S. Out of Tithe Case, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 16, 1994, at IA.
23. See Nackman, supra note 19, at 15.
24. Id.
25. Clinton 'Values' Ads Draw Sharp Criticism, S. CAL. CHRISTIAN TIMES, Nov. 1996,
at Al. The President also raised the issue in a televised debate with challenger Bob Dole when,
in response to a question, the President stated as follows:
One of my proudest moments was signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
which says the government's got to bend over backwards before we interfere with
religious practice. So I changed the Justice Department effort to get a church to pay back
a man's tithe because he was bankrupt when he gave it.
Transcriptof Second Televised Debate Between Clinton and Dole, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1996,
at BO.
26. Tim Bryant, Court To Rule on Rendering unto Caesar, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 14, 1994, at IA.
27. Lyle Denniston, Justice Department Drops Church Case, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 14,
1994, at lA.
28. CreditorsSue for Money Donatedto Church (National Public Radio Broadcast, June 16,
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that church members ought to be more concerned about paying their bills than
about trying to secure for themselves a special exemption from laws that apply

to other citizens.29
Approximately one year and eight months after it heard oral argument, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court. The court held
30
that the debtors' contributions were fraudulent transfers under the Code.
The court also held, however, that the recovery of the contributions violated
RFRA because it substantially burdened the debtors' free exercise of religion
and was not in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest. 31 The
trustee has appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court.32
Young and similar cases cannot be fully understood apart from larger social
and political forces at work in this decade. First, the revamped "religious

right" is staking a claim to greater political and legal prominence. 3 To this
group, Young represents another in a long line of examples of the disrespect
that secular society has for those of religious faith.34 Second, religion and
religious issues (such as abortion, euthanasia, prayer in schools) dominate
newspaper headlines. 5 Public discussion of religious issues has focused
renewed attention on the conflict between secular and religious values. 6

1994).
29. Render unto Caesar: Religious Freedom Isn't an Escape Hatch for Bankruptcy,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAzETTE, June 2, 1994, at B2.
30. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1416 (8th
Cir. 1996), petitionfor cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1996) (No. 96-437).
31. Id. at 1420.
32. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 65 U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S.
Sept. 19, 1996) (No. 96-437).
33. See Don Feder, Social Contract Written On Wind, BOSTON HERALD, May 22, 1995,
at 25; Norman Lear & David Ramage, Look Behind ChristianCoalition'sBenign Face, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, May 17, 1995, at A29; NormanLear & David Ramage, Perspectiveon the Christian
Coalition:Is This a Make-Over or Is It a Cover-Up?, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 1995, at B7. For
examples of the religious right's foray into legal advocacy, see Gustav Niebuhr, Conservatives
New Frontier: Religious Liberty Law Finns, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1995, at 1.
34. See Christine Wicker, "SoulFreedom"Fighter;LeaderofBaptistAdvocacy
GroupBattles
School PrayerAmendment, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 8, 1995, at 1G.
35. See, e.g., RichardBerke, Abortion Foes on a Roll, but Many Promise Not To Dictate
GOP'sPick, S.D. UNION-TRm., July 2, 1995, at A10; Jerry Gray, School PrayerDebateOpens
with Everything but Silence, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1995, at A20; Healing Old Wounds-We All
ShouldHave Choicesin PreparingforOurDeath,SEATTLETIMES, July 1, 1995, at A15; Scripps
Howard, Lawmaker Spells Out PrayerBill, ARIz. REPUB., June 9, 1995, at AS; Kervorkian
Opens Clinic, Attends 24th Death, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1995, at A10; Michael Tackett,
Adamant Abortion Foes Look for a Candidate, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 1995, § 1, at 11;
36. See W. Burlette Carter, Can this Culture Be Saved: Another Affirmative Action Baby
Reflects on Religious Freedom, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 473-474 nn.3-5 (1995) (reviewing
STEPHEN CARTER,

THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN

LAW AND

POLITICS

TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993)).
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Finally, the 1980's witnessed an unprecedented number of middle-class "baby
boomers" filing bankruptcy petitions.3 7 This phenomenon dovetailed with
another equally intriguing development. Middle-class "baby boomers" seemed
to be returning to the nation's church pews in large numbers."
Unfortunately, but perhaps predictably, the impassioned rhetoric used by
both the secular and religious circles has created some vitally important
underlying questions. How should bankruptcy law and policy interact with
doctrines that have as their aim the protection of religious freedom? How
broadly should RFRA be interpreted? Is it possible to find an accommodation
between the two doctrines? If so, what should be the structure of
that accommodation?
I attempt in this article to provide some answers to these questions and to
reveal some fundamental tensions thus far overlooked. The article will not
revisit the lower court opinions in Young. Those decisions have been analyzed
elsewhere.39 Instead, I center my critique on the Eighth Circuit's opinion, the
most recent and authoritative precedent as of this writing. My critique reveals
that although the Young court reached a result that is unassailable as a matter
of bankruptcy policy, the court ultimately undermined the essence of
that policy with a strikingly conclusory opinion on the RFRA issues in the
case. In so doing, the court failed to address squarely what is genuinely
at stake in these cases. I then illuminate this point by developing and analyzing
three possible approaches to mediating the conflict between bankruptcy law
and RFRA. I conclude with thoughts on an acceptable accommodation between
bankruptcy's fraudulent transfer law and RFRA.
II. CHRISTIANS V. CRYSTAL FREE EVANGELICAL CHURCH (IN RE YOUNG)40
The basic facts of Young were not in dispute. The Youngs were active
members of the Crystal Free Evangelical Church in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

37. Wade Lambert, The New Faces of PersonalBankruptcy: Baby Boomers, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 7, 1993, at B1.
38. See Churchgoing Boomers Prove Reports of God's Death are Greatly Exaggerated,
BOOMER REP., July 15, 1991; Richard N. Osflings, The Church Search, TIME, April 5, 1993,
at 44, 45-46.
39. See, e.g., Michael M. Duclos, A Debtor's Right to Tithe in Bankruptcy Under the
ReligiousFreedom RestorationAct, 11 BANKR. DEv. J. 665 (1995); Oliver B. Pollak, "Be Just
Before You're Generous": Tithing and CharitableContributionsin Bankruptcy, 29 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 527 (1996); Robert J. Bein, Comment, Robbing Peter To Pay Paul: Charitable
Donationsas FraudulentTransfers, 100 DICK. L. REv. 103 (1995); Steven Hopkins, Comment,
Is God a Preferred Creditor?Tithing as an Avoidable Transfer in Chapter 7 Bankruptcies, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 1139 (1995).
40. 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996),petitionforcert.filed,65 U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S. Sept. 19,
1996) (No. 96-437).
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They made regular contributions to the church, as a part of their religious
beliefs. Tithing was not a condition of membership in the church, nor was it
a condition for attendance. All parties agreed that the Youngs were sincere in
their religious faith. In February 1992, the Youngs filed a joint petition under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. During the year preceding the filing, they
had contributed $13,450.00 to the church. Also during this time, they were
legally insolvent.4 1 The trustee brought an action in the bankruptcy court
seeking to recover the money the debtors had given to the church, arguing
that the debtors received "less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for"42 their contributions.43
The bankruptcy court ruled against the church and offered several reasons
for finding that the debtors did not receive reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for their contributions. First, the benefits they received were not
physical or material.' Second, the contributions were strictly religious and
thus did not contribute to the maximization of the bankruptcy estate.45 Third,
assuming the debtors received value, that value was not "in exchange for"
their contributions because participation in the church was not conditioned on
tithing.4 6 The church appealed to the district court and the district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's analysis of § 548(a)(2)(A).47 That is, the
district court agreed that the debtors did not receive reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for their contributions.48 Reviewing the constitutional
issues for the first time, the district court held that the trustee's actions did not
violate the free exercise clause under Employment Division, Department of
Resources v. Smith49 because the Code was a neutral law of general applicability and the government had a compelling interest in the bankruptcy.50 The
district court also held that § 548 did not violate the establishment clause

41. Id. at 1410.

42. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1994).
43. Young, 82 F.3d at 1410.
44. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young) 148 B.R. 886, 891-92
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1992), af'd., 152 B.R. 939 (D. Minn. 1993), rev'd., 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir.
1996).

45. Id. at 893-94.
46. Id. at 895.
47. Young, 152 B.R. at 948. There were some subtle differences between the analysis of the
bankruptcy court and district court on the issue of how the Code defines "value" in this context.
The bankruptcy court defined value in terms of that which is tangible, financial, and marketable,
from the creditors' point of view. Young, 148 B.R. at 894. The district court defined value by
looking to both direct and indirect economic benefit, as long as the benefit is "fairly concrete."
Young, 152 B.R. at 945 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Minnesota Util. Contracting, Inc. (In re
Minnesota Util. Contracting, Inc.), 110 B.R. 414, 420 (D. Minn. 1990)).
48. Young, 152 B.R. at 948.
49. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
50. Young, 152 B.R. at 953-54.
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because it had a secular purpose, it neither advanced nor inhibited religion,
and it did not threaten excessive religious entanglements." In the interim
between the district court decision and oral argument
before the Eighth Circuit
52
Court of Appeals, Congress passed RFRA.
In its appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the church made three
arguments. First, the church posited that the district court should not have
applied § 548. Second, assuming § 548 to be applicable, the church claimed
it was error to find that the debtors did not receive reasonably equivalent value
in exchange for contributions to the church. Third, the petitioners argued that
requiring the return of contributions in such circumstances violates the free
exercise clause of the constitution because it substantially burdens
religion and
53
is not in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.
More precisely, the church's first argument was that the district court
should not have applied § 548 because the statute is labeled "fraudulent
transfers and obligations." 54 The church contended that application of the
statute was improper because in this case there was no evidence of fraudulent
intent. 5 The church seemed concerned that fixing such an ominous-sounding
label morally impugned the debtors and, at least indirectly, the church. 6 The
court's handling of this argument provides an early indication of its conflicting
attitudes about this case. On one hand, the court seemed to go out of its way
to soothe the church's wounded pride. The court noted that it would prefer to
call the debtors' contributions "avoidable transfers. " " As a matter of
bankruptcy law, that designation is not wholly correct, since avoidable transfer
is a broad term under the Code. Properly understood, the term refers to a
variety of avoidance actions, some of which are completely unrelated to
fraudulent transfers. 58 The court then reminded us that the trustee did not
accuse the church or the debtors of any "improper conduct, much less actual
fraud. " 5 On the other hand, the court firmly rejected the core of the church's
argument. The court noted correctly that the trustee did not have to prove

51. Id. at 955.
52. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
53. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1406, 1413 (8th
Cir. 1996), petitionfor cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1996) (No. 96-437).
54. Id. at 1413 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 548).
55. Id. at 1414.
56. Id. at 1413-14. In its argument to the district court, the church noted that it was
"offended at the characterization of the transfers as 'fraudulent."' Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church (Inre Young) 152 B.R. 939,950 (D. Minn. 1993), rev'd, 82 F.3d 1407
(8th Cir. 1996), petitionfor cert.filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1996) (No. 96-437).
57. Young, 82 F.3d at 1414.
58. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547 (1994) (providing for avoidable transfers under
bankruptcy's strong arm clause and preference provisions).
59. Young, 82 F.3d at 1414.
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actual fraud since § 548(a)(2)(a) is a constructive fraud provision.' Additionally, the court characterized this argument as "preliminary" 6 (as if to suggest
its lack of weight) and the church's second argument as "substantive."62
The court next considered the church's argument that the district court
erred in finding that the debtors did not receive "reasonably equivalent value
in exchange for"' their contributions to the church. The church argued
that the district court improperly defined "value" in a way that excluded
indirect economic benefits the debtors received, such as tax deductions, church
membership and spiritual counseling. Moreover, the church contended that the
contributions were made "in exchange for" indirect services received around
the same time the contributions were made, thereby creating a nexus between

the contributions and the services.'
The court responded by affirming, at least in part, the district court's
analysis. First, the court noted that the district court did not define "value"
narrowly to include only tangible property. Instead, the district court allowed
for the possibility of indirect benefits as long as those benefits were "fairly
concrete. "I The court did not offer a definition of the term fairly concrete,
but it did endorse the district court's analysis to the extent that the district
court chose not to define "indirect economic benefit" solely in terms of legal,
equitable, or ownership interests.' The court did not, however, endorse the
district court's finding on the ultimate issue of whether the debtors received
any economic benefit from the church services. In fact, the court chose not to
rule on that question, curiously deeming it only tangential.67

60. Id.
61. Id. at 1413.
As a preliminary matter, the church argues that this caption is not merely "unfortunate"
but significant because the purpose of the section is to avoid transfers made with
fraudulent intent or at least under circumstances under which a transfer may be
considered fraudulent. ... We next consider the church's substantive statutory
argument. Id. at 1413-14.
62. Id. at 1414.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1994).
64. Young, 82 F.3d at 1414.
65. Id. at 1415 (citing Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (Inre Young) 152 B.R.
939, 945 (D. Minn. 1993), rev'd, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65
U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1996) (No. 96-437)).
66. Id.
67. Id. "In any event, in the present case, whether the debtors received any economic benefit
from the church services is beside the point." Id. "For purposes of analysis, we have also
assumed that the contributions and the church services were reasonably equivalent and thus need
not take up the constitutionally suspect and difficult task of attempting to value the church
services." Id. at 1415, n.4.
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In the view of the court, the main weakness with the church's argument
was that the debtors did not make their contributions in exchange for the
church services.68 The debtors stipulated that they did not give the money
with the expectation that they would receive a "quid pro quo"69 in the form
of tangible benefits. Moreover, church services and activities would have been
available to them even if they had given nothing. As such, the court adopted
completely the reasoning of the district court and the bankruptcy court-§ 548
called for return of the contributions.7"
Although the court's failure to adequately address the reasonably equivalent
value issue undermines the logical force of the opinion, the ultimate result is
unassailable as a matter of bankruptcy policy. At the heart of bankruptcy's
fraudulent transfer law lies the notion that creditors should be protected from
attempts (actually or constructively fraudulent) to deplete assets that would
have otherwise gone to deserving creditors. Because of this notion, even
innocent actions that would be permissible outside of bankruptcy are not
permissible inside of bankruptcy, or when a bankruptcy is likely.7
Having concluded that the debtor's contributions were avoidable transfers' and recoverable by the trustee under § 548(a)(2), the court turned to
the church's free exercise claim. The church argued that the debtors' free
exercise of their religion was substantially burdened and that the trustee's
action was not in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.7" After
discussing the history and purpose of RFRA, the court concluded that the
church was right. Recovery of these contributions substantially burdened the
debtors' free exercise of religion and was not in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest.7'
The court's treatment of the substantial burden issue is glaringly sparse,
consisting of one paragraph. Oddly, that paragraph began with the court
stating that it would assume that recovery of these contributions would
represent a substantial burden.' s The court then reasoned in support of
that conclusion, noting first that the tithing was religiously motivated. Second,
the court opined that permitting the trustee, as a representative of the
government, to recover the contributions would effectively prevent the debtors

68. Young, 82 F.3d at 1415.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Both the law of fraudulent transfers and preference law provide examples of this idea.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
73. Young, 82 F.3d at 1417. The church argued that the substantial burden took the form
of unfair discrimination against religions in general; more specifically religions that rely on
donations; and most specifically, religions that encourage tithing at the 10% level. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1418.
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from tithing. 6 The court then announced: "It is sufficient that the governmental action in question meaningfully curtails, albeit retroactively, a religious
practice of more than minimal significance in a way that is not merely
incidental. "'

The court did not explain the concept of meaningful curtailment, nor did
it explain fully how that concept applied to these facts. The court merely cited
to one case that supports its basic reasoning" and one that does not. 9
Moreover, the court completely dismissed, without analysis, the retroactive
nature of the trustee's action. As the dissenting opinion noted, the substantial
burden issue deserves a more detailed analysis than that offered by the
court.10

In fact, the opinion of the dissenting judge seems more persuasive on this
point, in part at least, because it contains a more extensive application of the
substantial burden standard to the facts in the case. The dissent did not
question the debtors' sincerity, nor did it question that tithing was essential to
their religious practice."' The dissent noted, however, three facts entered into
evidence (and uncontroverted) which led it to the conclusion that the trustee's
action did not violate the substantial burden test. First, the debtors had an
opportunity to tithe and express their commitment to their faith." Second,
§ 548 did not prevent them from tithing because the funds had already been
tithed.83 Third, tithing is not required to participate in church services and
the debtors can continue to tithe, assuming they do not file for bankruptcy
84
again.
After examining the substantial burden issue, the court in the majority
opinion then turned its attention to the compelling governmental interest
analysis. The court's analysis of this issue is also remarkably slim. The trustee
argued that the Code and § 548 further compelling governmental interests
because they allow debtors to obtain a fresh start and they promote creditor
collection through estate maximization.' In response, the bankruptcy court
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1418-19.
78. Id. at 1419 (citing In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995).
79. Id. at 1419 (citing Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1995)).
80. Id. at 1421 (Bogue, J., dissenting).
[Ilt is important that the substantial burden step in the RFRA analysis is not reduced to
a perfunctory determination or foregone conclusion. A searching inquiry is required to
"protect the government from having to justify its regulations under a compelling interest
standard if the burden on the asserted practice is incidental or de minimis."
Id. (quoting Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1444 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
81. Id. at 1421.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1422.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1419. The court also cited to the bankruptcy case of Morris v. Midway S. Baptist
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and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals cited the bankruptcy case of In re
Tessier"5 , in which a bankruptcy court interpreted the compelling governmental interest requirement as relating directly to the "survival of the republic or
the physical safety of its citizens."" The Young court concluded that the
interests cited by the trustee and those mentioned by the bankruptcy court in
Newman did not rise to the level of national security or public safety."8
There are two problems with the court's analysis of the compelling
governmental interest issue. First, the court did not reveal precisely
what standard it was applying. The court suggested that the Tessier standard
might be too narrow, 9 but it failed to offer any clear alternative. Second, the
court's analysis of the issue seems woefully conclusory. ° The court simply
asserted, without explanation, that bankruptcy is not like the tax or social
security systems that have been recognized by courts as serving compelling
governmental interests. 9 The court was also dismissive in considering the
effects that a free exercise exemption from fraudulent transfer actions might
have on the bankruptcy system.' As the dissenting judge pointed out, the
decision may have the effect of fundamentally altering the way some creditor
transactions are structured, since now creditors will have an incentive to ask
potential borrowers about their past and present patterns of religious giving.9

Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995). The Newman court cited two
other compelling interests: administration of the bankruptcy system and recovery of fraudulent
transfers. Id. at 252.
86. 190 B.R. 396 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995).
87. Id. at 405.
88. Young, 82 F.3d at 1420.
89. Id.
90. Id.
We also agree that allowing debtors to get a fresh start or protecting the interests of
creditors is not comparable to the collection of revenue through the tax system or the
fiscal integrity of the social security system, which have been recognized as compelling
governmental interests in the face of a religious exercise claim.
Id.
91. But see In re Turner, 193 B.R. 548, 555-56 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding
that § 110(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires petition preparers to place their social
security numbers on documents for filing, did not violate RFRA, in part, because it was
supported by a compelling governmental interest in preventing the widespread fraud and abuse
by petition preparers who prey on the poor and the unsophisticated).
92. Young, 82 F.3d at 1420.
Moreover, we cannot see how the recognition of what is in effect a free exercise
exception to the avoidance of fraudulent transfers can undermine the integrity of the
bankruptcy system as a whole; its effect will necessarily be limited to the debtor's
creditors, who will as a result have fewer assets available to apply to the outstanding
liabilities, and not all creditors or even all debtors.
Id.
93. Id. at 1423 (Bogue, J., dissenting).
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After such a long wait, the Eighth Circuit's opinion seems a major
disappointment. The court probably reached the right result as a matter of
bankruptcy law and policy. Yet, the court's conclusory treatment of the RFRA
issues ultimately undermines the core of that law and that policy. Furthermore,
the decision will not provide much in the way of helpful guidance to lower
courts on the RFRA issues because the court neither adequately defined nor
fully addressed those issues. At bottom, the court failed to confront squarely
what is at stake in cases like Young, and as a result, the opinion obscures more
than it clarifies. In the next part of this article, I will analyze three approaches
to mediating the conflict between bankruptcy's fraudulent transfer law and
RFRA and, in so doing, illustrate the hard choices among competing,
legitimate interests that these cases present.
Iml.

THREE APPROACHES TO MEDIATING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW AND THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT

A. Standardizing "Value"
One way to resolve the conflict presented by Young is to apply § 548(a)(2)(A) on its terms and treat religious donations as we would any other
transfer. We could call this approach "standardizing value" because it
embodies two assumptions: First, the competing conceptions of
what constitutes "reasonably equivalent value" (the Code's and the church's)
should be compared.' Second, the frame of reference for the comparison
should be external to religious faith. In this case, the external reference is the
term reasonably equivalent value, as that term has been interpreted by most
courts. Under this approach, the church's conception of reasonably equivalent
value is necessarily subordinated to an alternative standard. This approach best
describes the one taken by the bankruptcy court and the district court in
Young. As a jurisprudential matter, this approach assumes that an application
of the statute's plain language best addresses the interpretive problem.
A standardization also allows the legal meaning of the term reasonably
equivalent value to maintain some measure of consistency across different
factual settings in bankruptcy law. This consistency becomes apparent when
one observes that courts usually have been quite rigorous when scrutinizing the
value received by debtors in fraudulent transfer litigation.9" Under this

94. I would characterize the Code's conception of reasonably equivalent value as anchored
in economics, with an emphasis on that which is tangible, marketable, or material. I would
characterize the church's conception of reasonably equivalent value as rooted largely in the noneconomic-emphasizing spiritual, personal, and even community gains that are not quantifiable
in a market sense.
95. See Covey v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 960 F.2d 657, 662 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
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proposal, reasonably equivalent value is not highly situational, at least as a
legal concept. It does not carry one meaning for religion cases and a different
meaning for others. Perhaps this is the way it should be unless and until
Congress drafts a specific exemption for religious donations. Of course, the
term reasonably equivalent value contains its own ambiguities. But having
bankruptcy judges interpret that term seems easier, by comparison, than
having those same judges administer a blanket statutory exemption for
religious donations.9" The latter option would inevitably lead bankruptcy
judges into the thicket of determining what constitutes a bona fide religion and
what constitutes a sincere belief within that religion. Identifying a bonafide
religion is certainly not a simple inquiry and not one with which bankruptcy
judges have traditionally had expertise. In contrast, bankruptcy judges do have
a certain measure of expertise in generally making valuation determinations
and in specifically assessing reasonably equivalent value.
This proposal also derives strength from its consistency with bankruptcy
policy in the area of fraudulent transfer law and with the spirit of avoiding
powers generally. One of the underlying notions of avoiding powers is the idea
that private agreements that might be good for the debtor and a single creditor
(in this case, the church) might not be good for creditors as a whole.
Advocates for churches sometimes seem to forget that the money recovered by
the trustee is intended for unsecured creditors whom, after all, the debtor has
also promised to repay.
This method of resolving the conflict between fraudulent transfer law and
RFRA will not necessarily lead to disaster for churches. Charities can at least

creditor's claim that resale price may be presumed to be reasonably equivalent value when
that creditor "seize[s] an asset and sell[s] it for just enough to cover its loan (even if it would
have been worth substantially more as part of an ongoing enterprise)"); Cooper v. Ashley
Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Communications NC, Inc.), 914 F.2d 458, 469 (4th Cir.
1990) (holding that for purposes of determining reasonably equivalent value, the worth of an
entry in a cellular phone license lottery should be discounted to reflect probability of winning);
Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 991-92 (2d Cir. 1981) (recognizing
that debtors may have received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for incurring obligations
even if benefit was indirect, but holding that benefit had to be quantified and compared to the
amount of the obligation incurred); Wells Fargo Bank v. Desert View Bldg. Supplies, Inc. (In
re Desert View Bldg. Supplies, Inc.), 475 F. Supp. 693, 696 (D. Nev. 1978), aff'd without
opinion, 633 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that a $250,000 loan transaction was without fair
consideration because, even though the debtor received proceeds from a loan, the transaction
ultimately did not benefit the debtor). But see Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications,
Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 647-48 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that the synergistic relationship between the
parent company and the debtor constituted a reasonably equivalent value and that precise
quantification of the benefit was not necessary); Jones v. National City Bank (In re Greenbrook
Carpet Co., Inc.), 722 F.2d 659, 660 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding that a loan made
to the debtor for the benefit of the stockholders constituted reasonably equivalent value, even
though the debtor received in return only worthless collateral in the form of stock).
96. See proposal discussed infra Part III.B.
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be assured that the same rules which apply to other creditors (including other
churches with a tradition of tithing) will apply to them. Moreover, churches
often face the risk that promised financial pledges will not materialize, due to
factors such as job loss, divorce, or transfer of membership. Churches, like
other entities to whom debtors make promises, are simply accommodating
another contingency: the bankruptcy of a regular contributor.
Of course, before one is prepared to endorse this proposal, its two guiding
assumptions mentioned above must be accepted: (1) that the competing
conceptions of value should be compared and (2) that an external frame of
reference should serve as the baseline. Both of these assumptions are open to
challenge. For example, one might ask how the competing conceptions of
reasonably equivalent value can be compared when one (the Code's) is secular
and the other (the church's) is spiritual. The "value" contemplated by the
Code is economic, and that contemplated by the church is non-economic. The
value gained from tithing comes from the spiritual satisfaction one receives
from being faithful to God and keeping God's commandments.' Understood
this way, the conflict between the two competing conceptions of reasonably
equivalent value seems fundamentally irreconcilable. It is impossible to
conclude the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value or to
conclude the opposite because this conflict simply does not fit into the Code's
existing analytical framework.
This criticism suggests a problem with the second assumption undergirding
the standardization proposal. It presumes that a baseline derived from secular
notions should serve as the sole reference point for the comparison. This
prompts one to ask why the reference point should be wholly external. Should
not our selection of the reference point account for the internal, spiritual
dimensions of the debtor's life? The basic normative claim is that bankruptcy's
fraudulent transfer law should adjust, in some measure, to the practices and
patterns of everyday life, when those patterns and practices arise out of deeply
felt personal convictions. To the extent that fraudulent transfer law cannot
integrate such convictions, it risks seeming myopic and insular to many. Under
this view, the proper approach might be to discard reasonably equivalent value
as the reference point and exempt altogether most religious donations from the

97. See Malachi 3:8-10:
Will a man rob God? Yet ye have robbed me. But ye say, Wherein have we robbed
thee? In tithes and offerings. Ye are cursed with a curse; for ye have robbed me, even
this whole nation. Bring ye all the tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in
mine house, and prove me now herewith, saith the Lord of hosts, if I will not open you
the windows of heaven, and pour you out a blessing, that there shall not be room enough
to receive it.
Of course, this argumenthas notbeen accepted by most courts, so churches have argued that they
did receive an indirect economic benefit for their donations in the form of, among other things,
spiritual counseling and tax deductions. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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reach of § 548(a)(2)(A). 98 This aptly describes the position taken by the
Court of Appeals in Young.
On the other hand, a law that, to some, seems myopic and insular may, to
others, seem useful precisely because of its confines. Analytical markers such
as reasonably equivalent value make it possible to resolve specific allocational
and distributive choices in bankruptcy.
Congress has determined
that bankruptcy's regulatory agenda should advance certain goals, among them
creditor collections. Congress has built into the Code concepts that it believed
would advance these priorities. Courts should interpret the Code in ways
that vindicate, not undermine, Congressional aims. The best way for courts to
do this, the argument goes, is to apply § 548(a)(2)(A) on its terms and
treat religious donations as we would any other transfer.
This proposal rests on the assumption that the Code and § 548 advance
compelling governmental interests. While the bankruptcy system might not be
directly comparable to the tax or the social security systems, that alone does
not negate the possibility that the bankruptcy system can serve compelling
governmental interests. The economic vibrancy of the nation depends upon
maintaining a workable system for settling debts in the context of multiple
defaults. Having such a system encourages people and institutions to risk
human and financial capital in ways that stimulate economic growth. This is
particularly true as more and more individuals and institutions interact with the
bankruptcy system due to the steadily increasing number of filings. 99
B. Exempting Religious Transfers
A second response to Young would involve amending the Code to include
a specific statutory exemption for religious donations. Presumably, advocates
for churches would not be completely happy with an exemption that was
judicially crafted and enforced. Maximum protection could come only from a
blanket, statutory exemption directed solely at protecting religious donations.
This is essentially what the Appeals Court did in Young, except that the court
derived the exemption from RFRA, not the Code.
This proposal honors, in an affirmative way, the intangible of spiritual
gain. It recognizes honestly that spiritual gain is not reducible to secular
notions of value. It readily admits that these cases do not fit into the present
analytical framework and suggests, therefore, that we ought to take them out.
The idea that certain types of cases are not appropriate for the reasonably
equivalent value analysis of § 548(a)(2)(A) is hardly revolutionary. For
example, commentators and some courts have argued that, absent actual fraud,

98. Presumably, religious donations would not be safe from attack if the trustee could prove
actual fraud.
99. See supra note 3.
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leveraged buy-outs should not be subject to constructive fraud analysis. The
argument is that highly leveraged corporate transactions, in the main, represent
more of a benefit to society than a detriment because they are economically
efficient. 1' In the same way, one who advocates exempting religious
donations might argue that we as a society have more to gain from leaving
these donations with the churches to which they were pledged.
At the same time, this approach recognizes that some debtors who tithe
arguably receive an economic benefit, albeit indirect. Many of today's
churches, particularly those in suburban areas, operate in an increasingly
competitive market when it comes to attracting and retaining members." 1 As
a result, many offer more services to church members than were offered in the
past."° Churches are now more likely than ever before to offer child care,
psychological counseling, and exercise programs. To the extent that these
programs make church members better employees, spouses or parents, they
can be viewed as offering indirect benefits. For example, these programs
might help the debtor's other creditors by increasing the debtor's personal and
professional productivity. According to some courts, indirect benefits count
toward reasonably equivalent value and do not necessarily have to be
quantifiable.0 3
One problem with this approach is that it has the effect of diverting value
that would otherwise go to creditors, but for the exemption. Because this
exemption covers only religious transfers, private and public creditors are
being forced to subsidize the churches of bankrupt debtors. This raises the
issue of whether an exemption of this nature violates the Establishment Clause
of the Constitution. Of course, some private, consensual creditors can protect
themselves, to a certain extent, by asking questions about their debtor's giving
habits prior to making loans. This is not, however, cost-effective for many
creditors and it is impossible for non-consensual creditors like the IRS and tort
claimants. Moreover, no other charitable institutions get this kind of special
treatment. It is unclear, strictly as an economic matter, why other charitable
institutions such as the Red Cross or the United Way should not be entitled to
a similar subsidy.

100. See Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 847 n.10 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that fraudulent
transfer law should not be used to force selling shareholders to disgorge payments); Douglas
G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, FraudulentConveyanceLawandtsProperDonain,38 VAND.
L. REV. 829, 854 (1985).
101. See supra note 36.
102. See supra note 36.
103. See, e.g., Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc, 945 F.2d 635, 646-47 (3d
Cir. 1991) (holding that the synergistic relationship between parent company and debtor
constituted reasonably equivalent value and that precise quantification of benefit was not
necessary).
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The diversion of value problem is enhanced when one considers that this
exception applies to all religious donations no matter how large, as long as
they are not given under circumstances which suggest actual fraud. This makes
a mockery of the longstanding idea that debtors hold their property in trust for
their creditors. 1 It also distorts giving habits and thus creates two problems.
First, more charitable funds go to churches than is societally optimal, given
that other needy causes exist. Second, as private creditors adjust for the
increased risk, they might become more intrusive when gathering information
about a potential debtor prior to lending. Creditors can be expected to ask loan
applicants if they have a pattern or practice of religious giving. This raises
another potent issue: if the creditor denies the loan based upon information in
response to these questions, does the creditor commit unlawful discrimination
based on religion?
Additionally, there are theological complications. No doubt one who relies
on the Bible to organize one's beliefs and practices can find passages in
scripture that support the practice of tithing; however, there are ambiguities.
A person could heed Romans 13:6-7 wherein the Apostle Paul states, "For
because of this you also pay taxes, for they are God's ministers attending
continually to this very thing. Render therefore to all their due, customs to
whom customs, fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor."" ° That same
person might also find guidance in Mark 12:17 wherein Jesus commands,
"Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are
God's.""'5 This should not be construed as suggesting that tithing is somehow less important than meeting one's worldly obligations. When it comes to
proper stewardship of resources, however, difficult value choices seem
inevitable. These value choices seem best left to individual prayer and
reflection. Crafting a broad statutory exemption based on the selective use of
scripture seems unwise.
Given the problems that might result from an undiscriminating statutory
exemption, churches should bear the burden of showing that recovery of the
contributions represents a substantial burden on the free exercise of their
member-debtors' religion. The holding in Young notwithstanding, churches
have not yet made a persuasive case."°7 In none of the cases currently before
104. See Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 813 (K.B. 1601) (noting that there was a "trust
between the parties, for the [debtor] possessed all, and used them as his proper goods, and fraud
is always apparelled and clad with a trust, and a trust is the cover of fraud"); Robert Charles
Clark, The Duties of the CorporateDebtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REV. 505, 510-11
(1977).
105. Romans 13:1-7. In the passages immediately before these, Paul discusses a Christian's
responsibilities toward government authorities.
106. Mark 12:17. In surrounding passages, Jesus is responding to Pharisees and Herodians who
try to trap Jesus by asking him, "Is it lawful to pay taxes to Caesar, or not? Shall we pay or shall
we not pay?" Mark 12:14-15.
107. See criticisms of Young court's perfunctory analysis of the substantial burden issue supra
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the courts were the debtors denied the opportunity to tithe. There was no limit
placed by the government or anyone else on the amount or frequency of
tithing. No debtor has been expelled from his church (or threatened with
expulsion) as a result of a trustee filing or winning one of these cases. Thus,
the debtors in these cases have the opportunity to practice their religious faith
without interference. The only function that § 548 serves is to retroactively
protect other creditors in situations where the debtor is insolvent. If this
function represents a "substantial burden," then that concept seems to have all
but lost its meaning.
Those who advocate an exemption might respond by noting that courts face
the problems of subsidization and theological difficulties anytime religious
liberty is at issue. Admittedly, the exemption issue presents those problems in
no greater or lesser scale. It need not be accepted, however, that religious
liberty is such a cherished value that we should surrender ourselves to these
problems and blindly forge ahead in the name of liberty or protection. As for
the claim that the substantial burden seems tenuous, exemption advocates
might respond that, although these cases might not present the kind of
imminent threat to religious practice presented by other laws, they remain
important, if only as a symbol of religious liberty and the importance of
remaining vigilant against threats to it. But to the extent that law is understood
to be derived from facts, not symbols, the victory that churches secured in
Young may itself prove tenuous.
C. Adopting a Standardof "Reasonableness"
The final alternative involves adopting a standard of "reasonableness" for
religious donations. Section 548(a)(2)(A) would be amended to include this
explicit exception. A reasonableness approach would also constitute the
greatest effort to accommodate the conflicting demands of the Code and
RFRA. Its accommodating character is a source of strength as well as
weakness.
The strength of this proposal lies both in its form and substance. As a
formal matter, including the exception in the text of § 548 provides some
degree of uniformity because all courts would have a statutory duty to exempt
any religious donations that are reasonable. Substantively, this method would
protect those who in good faith contribute regular amounts to a church over
a long period of time. Thus, the proposal strives to uphold the spirit of
fraudulent transfer law. If the debtor is consistently giving amounts over a
long period, the debtor will less likely engage in side-dealing with the church
in a way that is harmful to other creditors. At the same time, this approach
injects into bankruptcy's fraudulent transfer law more sensitivity to strongly

Part II.
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held, personal notions of what seems just and fair. It attempts to temper
bankruptcy law's hard edges with a "fuzziness" that seems appropriate in
many of these cases.
The downside of this approach is its frustrating vagueness. This makes it
difficult to apply the standard and to predict outcomes. The reasonableness
approach may significantly impair the values of spirituality and individuality
discussed earlier by not providing enough protection for churches. On the
other hand, this approach could greatly weaken the goals of precision and
certainty that we expect from the Code by providing too much protection for
churches. In addition, there are several practical problems. What does it mean
to tithe "consistently" or "regularly?" How will reasonableness be determined?
Will we use a general "balancing of the equities" test or a multi-factor test?
If Congress provides no standard, then one will have to be developed on a
case-by-case basis, with the inevitability of confusing variations. Who would
bear the burden of proof, the church, the debtor, or the trustee? Should this
exception apply to fraudulent transfer actions brought under the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, 08 the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,0 9
or under the common law governing avoidance of fraudulent conveyances?
Additionally, this proposal may weaken the objective nature of the
constructive fraud inquiry in § 548(a)(2)(A). This proposal injects subjective
indicators into the § 548(a)(2)(A) analysis. Courts will have to find a way to
integrate these objective and subjective components. Will the "reasonableness
exception" constitute an affirmative defense? Can the donation be partially
avoidable if the court finds that the debtor's contribution was only "partially
reasonable?"
IV. CONCLUSION: THOUGHTS ON ACCOMMODATION

In Young, the equitable protection of creditors through fraudulent transfer
law clashes with the perceived need to accommodate ordinary life practices.
The value received from these life practices is difficult to quantify in
traditional terms. The mere presence of this tension suggests that bankruptcy
law is continuing to evolve from an insular sub-specialty into a more expansive
body of law that penetrates domains of life from which we previously thought
it largely absent.
One implication of the preceding analysis is that bankruptcy law and
jurisprudence must adjust to this continuing transformation. Bankruptcy law
should break free from excessive policy myopia" 0 but at the same time

108. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT,7A U.L.A. 643 (1985).
109. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT,7A U.L.A. 430 (1985).
110. See Mary Jo Newborn Wiggins, Testing the Limits of CongressionalIntent: Divorce
Obligationsin Bankruptcy After the 1994 ReformAct, 6 J. BANKR. L.& PRAc. 181, 193 (1997)
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strive to remain true to its core policy commitments. This is a tricky but
necessary balancing act that demands a healthy degree of subtlety and nuance
in our analysis of many bankruptcy issues.
How do the proposals discussed in this article fare under this jurisprudential standard? Both the Young decision, which creates a RFRA exemption for
religious donations, and the proposal to exempt religious donations (discussed
in part III.B) by way of a Code-based exemption do not fare well. Both
approaches create broad and unwieldy exceptions for religious donations that
undermine the essence of fraudulent transfer bankruptcy policy. They both
divert value and might otherwise affect patterns of charitable giving in
negative ways. Adopting a standard of reasonableness (discussed in part III.C),
on the other hand, seems to leave us with a standard that is too amorphous and
indeterminate.
The preceding analysis suggests that the best approach would be to adopt
a hybrid of the "standardizing value" proposal (discussed in part III.A) and the
reasonableness proposal. Under this approach, we treat religious donations as
we would any other transfer, as subject to avoidance under § 548(a)(2)(A).
Instead of amending the Code to include an explicit exemption for donations
that are reasonable, we leave to the trustee"' the judgment as to whether a
donation (or series of donations) is reasonable. The trustee can make the
determination on a case-by-case basis. Were the debtor's actions reasonable?
An insolvent debtor who tithes large amounts to a church may sincerely
believe that he is fulfilling his religious obligations, but to the extent that a
debtor tithes, while creditors go unpaid, he is not acting in the best interests
of creditors as a whole. A practice of systematic giving at modest levels,
however, may have such a negligible impact on creditors so that fraudulent
transfer law should not be invoked. Those closest to the facts and the evidence
should make the decision. There is no reason to believe that trustees will use
their discretion unwisely. The cost of bringing fraudulent transfer cases
suggest that trustees do not file these actions unless there is a reasonable
likelihood of a substantial recovery.
This proposal for a "hybrid approach" will frustrate many advocates for
religious groups who favor a blanket exemption for all religious transfers. This
proposal will also frustrate those bankruptcy purists who do not believe it is
appropriate to conduct an inquiry into intent in what is, after all, a constructive
fraud statute. As this hybrid approach represents a compromise, it will attract
its share of detractors from both sides, and yet, that might just represent the
highest testament to its merits.

(noting that a kind of policy myopia sometimes affects our analysis of dischargeability issues in
bankruptcy).
111. Since most of these cases involve individual Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 filings, the trustee
will usually be the one who makes this decision. There is, however, no reason why a debtor-inpossession could not function similarly.
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